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MANDATORY  NATIONAL  SERVICE:  CREATING
GENERATIONS  OF  CIVIC  MINDED CITIZENS
Andrew M. Pauwels
I. INTRODUCTION
While on the campaign trail in the fall of 1960, Senator John F. Kennedy
addressed students at the University of Michigan, proposing a novel idea:
How many of you who are going to be doctors, are willing to spend your days
in Ghana?  Technicians or engineers, how many of you are willing to work in
the Foreign Service and spend your lives traveling around the world?  On
your willingness to do that, not merely to serve one year or two years in the
service, but on your willingness to contribute part of your life to this country,
I think will depend the answer whether a free society can compete.  I think it
can!  And I think Americans are willing to contribute.  But the effort must be
far greater than we have ever made in the past.1
With this call to action, Kennedy launched the Peace Corps,2 a federal pro-
gram that continues to place thousands of Americans in service-work
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2014; Bachelor of Arts,
University of Notre Dame, 2009.  I would like to thank Professor Anthony Bellia for
reading drafts of this Note and offering his thoughtful comments and advice.  I am also
grateful to the staff members of the Notre Dame Law Review for their editing assistance.  I
owe a great deal of thanks to my parents, Joseph and Virginia Pauwels, and to my brother,
Joseph Pauwels, Jr., for a lifetime of support, as well as to Jennifer Roberts for tolerating all
of the busy days and nights I put into this endeavor.  Finally, this Note is dedicated to the
students and staff of Eugene J. Butler Middle School.  Without my personal Teach for
America experience there, I would not have had the inspiration to write this Note.
1 Senator John F. Kennedy, Remarks at the University of Michigan (Oct. 14, 1960),
available at http://www.peacecorps.gov/about/history/speech/.
2 While the speech at Michigan is cited by many as the moment the Peace Corps was
born, see, e.g., History: A Proud and Changing World, PEACE CORPS (July 16, 2012), http://
www.peacecorps.gov/about/history/ (“The Peace Corps traces its roots and mission to
1960, when then-Sen. John F. Kennedy challenged students at the University of Michigan
to serve their country in the cause of peace by living and working in developing coun-
tries.”),  the initiative was more formally proposed, and first publicly referred to as the
“Peace Corps,” in a later campaign address. See Senator John F. Kennedy, Staffing a For-
eign Policy for Peace, Speech at Cow Palace, San Francisco, CA (Advance Release Text)
(Nov. 2, 1960), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25927 (“I
therefore propose . . . a Peace Corps of talented young men willing and able to serve their
country in this fashion for 3 years as an alternative to peacetime selective service . . . .”).
The Peace Corps was created by Executive Order. Establishment and Administration of the
2597
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opportunities abroad.3
While Kennedy evoked higher principles to draw young Americans on
college campuses to action, young Americans on the same college cam-
puses—and elsewhere—were publicly raging against a public duty: the mili-
tary draft.4  As the war in Vietnam ramped up, and more and more young
American males were conscripted into the armed services, people asked
more and more questions about the legitimacy—both constitutionally and
practically—of requiring military service.  While many proposed eliminating
the draft completely, others proposed a broader and more creative solution:
expanding service to create an obligation for all Americans.5  While the
scope of such proposals varied, the intentions were the same.  None of these
suggestions gained much traction, however, and calls for an expanded
national service program faded, especially as increased hostilities in Vietnam
distracted America’s leaders.6
In the late-1980s and early-1990s, the efforts of both Presidents George
H. W. Bush7 and Bill Clinton8 led to the creation of AmeriCorps, a federal
Peace Corps in the Department of State, Exec. Order No. 10,924, 26 Fed. Reg. 1789 (Mar.
2, 1961).
3 See Paul D. Coverdell, Peace Corps Fact Sheet, PEACE CORPS (Oct. 16, 2012), http://
files.peacecorps.gov/multimedia/pdf/about/pc_facts.pdf (listing, among other basic sta-
tistics, the current Peace Corps as roughly 9000 volunteers serving in seventy-five
countries).
4 See generally, e.g., SHERRY GERSHON GOTTLIEB, HELL NO WE WON’T GO!: RESISTING
THE DRAFT DURING THE VIETNAM WAR (1991) (presenting firsthand accounts of  draft
protests).
5 See Roger Landrum et al., Calls for National Service, in NATIONAL SERVICE 21, 33
(Michael W. Sherraden & Donald J. Eberly eds., 1982).
6 Id. at 35 (“[President Johnson] opted for guns and made no more speeches about
national service.  He apparently passed the word to the Marshall Commission not to rec-
ommend a national service program. . . . It was apparently the Vietnam War that continued
to be the major enemy of national service . . . .”).
7 On the campaign trail and at his inauguration, President Bush spoke often of an
America united in service to the community and the nation. See, e.g., George Bush, Inau-
gural Address (Jan. 20, 1989), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?
pid=16610 (“I have spoken of a Thousand Points of Light, of all the community organiza-
tions that are spread like stars throughout the Nation, doing good. . . . The old ideas are
new again because they’re not old, they are timeless: duty, sacrifice, commitment, and a
patriotism that finds its expression in taking part and pitching in.”).  In 1990, President
Bush signed into law the National and Community Service Act, laying a framework for
service learning in schools and service programs through colleges and non-profits. See
National and Community Service Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-610, 104 Stat. 3127 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
8 AmeriCorps was created in 1993, with the signing of the National and Community
Service Trust Act by then President Clinton; by the following fall, more than 20,000 Amer-
iCorps members were serving in 1000 American communities in need. See History, Legisla-
tion, and Budget, AMERICORPS, http://www.americorps.gov/about/ac/history.asp (last
visited Mar. 11, 2013); see also National and Community Service Trust Act of 1993, Pub. L.
No. 103-82, 107 Stat. 785 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 3, 16, and 42
U.S.C.).
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organization with goals similar to those of the Peace Corps, focused on
domestic service.9  AmeriCorps, and the many organizations under its
umbrella,10 have spiked in popularity,11 attracting highly qualified young
Americans and placing them in some of the most impoverished areas of the
United States.12
Despite the popularity of such programs, some scholars, mainstream
media members, and politicians argue this is not enough, calling on the gov-
ernment to broadly expand the national service programs.13  Many modest
expansions of existing programs are met with little controversy.14  However, a
few have advocated for sweeping changes in the form of mandatory national
service.15  Merely mentioning mandatory national service can invoke calls of
socialism and slavery, sparking pointed criticism regarding the merits and the
constitutionality of such a program.16
This Note will focus on the constitutionality of such a compulsory
national service program in hypothetical form.  While debate in the media
has focused on the socio-economic and vocational benefits of a broad
national service program, legal scholars have said little on the issue of
whether such a program would even withstand the scrutiny of the Supreme
9 For a broad discussion of AmeriCorps, including the program’s goals, see What is
AmeriCorps?, AMERICORPS, http://www.americorps.gov/about/ac/index.asp (last visited
Mar. 11, 2013).
10 Id. (“AmeriCorps is made up of three main programs: AmeriCorps State and
National, AmeriCorps VISTA, and AmeriCorps NCCC (National Civilian Community
Corps).”).  Other well-known organizations—such as Teach For America—also fall under
the AmeriCorps umbrella. See Assistance with Pre-Existing Loans: AmeriCorps Benefits, TEACH
FOR AMERICA, http://www.teachforamerica.org/why-teach-for-america/compensation-and-
benefits/assistance-pre-existing-loans (last visited March 11, 2013).
11 See Michael Brown, “No”—Nearly One Million Times, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 15,
2012, 5:07 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-brown/americorps-funding_b_
1280200.html (reporting that for the fall of 2012 AmeriCorps would have 82,000 new mem-
bers, from an applicant pool of roughly 582,000—a rejection rate of eighty-six percent).
12 See CORP. FOR NAT’L & CMTY. SERV., AMERICORPS: STATE COMMISSION PERFORMANCE
REPORT (2006) (detailing the efforts of AmeriCorps-funded agencies in each of the fifty
states).
13 See, e.g., Editorial, Expanding National Service, N.Y. TIMES (March 23, 2009), http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/03/24/opinion/24tue4.html?_r=0 (describing positively expan-
sions in the AmeriCorps programs early in President Obama’s first term).
14 See, e.g., David M. Herszenhorn, Senate Moves to Expand National Service Programs, N.Y.
TIMES (March 26, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/27/us/politics/27cong.html
(“The Senate overwhelmingly approved a bill . . . to broadly expand national community
service programs . . . . The vote was 78 to 20 on the measure, renamed the Senator Edward
M. Kennedy Serve America Act . . . .”).
15 See, e.g., Universal National Service Act, H.R. 5741, 111th Cong. (2010).
16 For an example of the heated discussion, compare generally David Brooks, Op-Ed.,
The Great Divorce, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/31/opin-
ion/brooks-the-great-divorce.html?_r=0, with Stuart Anderson, Mandatory “National Service”
for New York Times Columnists, FORBES (Jan. 31, 2012, 12:44 PM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/stuartanderson/2012/01/31/mandatory-national-service-for-new-york-times-colum-
nists/.
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Court.  Although no court has addressed the issue, legal scholars in the 1980s
briefly engaged in a dialogue regarding the validity of mandatory service.17
This dialogue will serve as a good starting point, with a set of circuit opinions
providing an additional analytical framework for what remains an open issue.
This Note will argue that such a scheme, though unprecedented in scope
and impact, would withstand constitutional scrutiny.  Politicians, scholars,
and—ultimately—voters must decide whether or not a program similar to
that proposed by this paper should move beyond the hypothetical and
become reality; such a normative argument, however, is beyond the scope of
this Note.
Part II will briefly describe the history of national service movements in
the United States by focusing on two broad programs which preceded the
wave of volunteerism sparked by the Peace Corps and AmeriCorps: the mili-
tary draft and the Civilian Conservation Corps.  Part III will analyze the Thir-
teenth Amendment prohibition against slavery, focusing broadly on the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence before turning to specific applications of the
Thirteenth Amendment: the military draft and mandatory “volunteer hour”
programs in public high schools.  In Part IV, this Note will propose and dis-
cuss three statutory schemes for making “mandatory” national service a real-
ity and the constitutionality of each.
II. A HISTORY OF NATIONAL SERVICE IN THE UNITED STATES
While mandatory national service has never been instituted in the
United States, several statutory regimes have created broad programs with
sweeping effects.  While a detailed history of all service initiatives in the
United States18 is beyond the scope of this Note, a few examples will help
frame the constitutional analysis.
A. The Military Draft
Compulsory military service—or, simply, a draft—is most likely what
comes to mind for most Americans when they hear compulsory national ser-
vice.  Because the Vietnam War and the surrounding social turmoil are so
engrained in our collective consciousness, it might be easy to assume that the
draft has been an enduring part of the American military and national iden-
tity.  This, however, is far from the truth.  For roughly the first century of
nationhood, the “regular army of the United States was little more than a
token force” and Americans “despised conscription.”19  America won the
17 See generally, e.g., Comm. on Fed. Legislation, The Constitutionality of a Mandatory Non-
Military National Service Obligation, 40 REC. ASS’N B. CITY N.Y. 618 (1985) (analyzing the
merits and constitutionality of various proposals to expand national service).
18 Also note that this Note focuses only on service initiatives in the United States.  The
experience of foreign countries could lend further to the discussion of national service but
are beyond the scope of this Note.
19 William G. Carleton, Raising Armies Before the Civil War, in THE MILITARY DRAFT 67,
67 (Martin Anderson ed., 1982).
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Revolution using a combination of state militias and unprofessional volun-
teers, recently recruited,20 and the young American nation relied on simi-
larly constructed forces in waging its wars in the early nineteenth century.21
The system exemplified “basic American conditions and values—localism,
pluralism, non-professionalism, devotion to liberty, and a folksy
egalitarianism.”22
Despite early calls from the likes of George Washington,23 conscription
or coerced service had no place in the American military until the Civil War,
when both the North and the South enacted military drafts.24  This invasion
on liberty was not well received, with “widespread and violent resistance,
especially in the North.”25  After the war’s end, the draft came to a close.  A
draft was utilized again in World War I, but, much like after the Civil War, the
draft ceased when the war ended.26
Congress enacted a peacetime draft for the first time in 1940, albeit
reluctantly, as World War II expanded in scope internationally;27 in fact, it
has been argued that the draft of 1940 “was justified only by the existence of
an emergency approximating a war crisis, and it was generally expected that
the restoration of normal times would bring the end of conscription.”28  In
effect, the draft was less of a peacetime draft and more of a “pre-war” draft.
Despite these short-term intensions, Congress continued to extend the selec-
tive service law after the conclusion of the war, and the peacetime draft
became a part of the American military culture.29  The draft continued—to
much controversy30—through the Vietnam War.31  In 1973, at the conclu-
sion of that conflict, the draft was again suspended and the military returned
to its all-volunteer roots.32  For a five year period—from 1975 to 1980—the
20 See id. at 68.
21 See id. at 69–70 (discussing use of state militias and wartime volunteers in the War of
1812 and, in the Mexican War, fewer state militias and a larger volunteer units, still gener-
ally distinct from “the regular army”).
22 Id. at 74.
23 Richard Gillam, The Peacetime Draft: Voluntarism to Coercion, in THE MILITARY DRAFT,
supra note 19, at 97, 101 (“George Washington had believed that a professional standing R
peacetime army was ‘indispensably necessary’ and had advocated coercion of service if it
were needed.”).
24 Id. at 102.
25 Id.
26 Id.  In between the Civil War and World War I, the Spanish-American War was
fought solely with a volunteer army. Id.
27 Id. at 103–04.
28 Id. at 103.
29 Id. at 105–16 (discussing failed Congressional attempts to eliminate the peacetime
draft).
30 See generally GOTTLIEB, supra note 4 (chronicling, in a mostly interview format, the R
anti-draft movement during the Vietnam War, including draft card burning, fleeing to
foreign countries, and on campus demonstrations).
31 See Background of Selective Service, SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM (Apr. 30, 2002), http://
www.sss.gov/backgr.htm.
32 Id.
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government also suspended registration for the Selective Service.33  How-
ever, President Carter reinstated the registration requirement in 1980,34 and
the Military Selective Service Act35 continues to make registration for the
draft an obligation of all eighteen-year-old American males.36
B. The Civilian Conservation Corps37
The Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) is perhaps the most successful
and least controversial example of the federal government mobilizing a large
portion of the population to perform nonmilitary service.38  President Frank-
lin D. Roosevelt oversaw the creation of the CCC within a month of taking
office in March of 1933 as part of the New Deal.39  To Roosevelt, the CCC
served a dual purpose: putting people back to work to combat the Great
Depression and preserving America’s natural resources.40  Affectionately
known by some as “Roosevelt’s Tree Army,”41 this unique collaboration
between the Departments of Agriculture, Interior, Labor, and War put peo-
ple to work on forestry, park maintenance, flood prevention, and other con-
servation programs.42
The CCC specifically targeted a segment of the population hit hard by
the Depression: young men.43  Of the roughly 3,000,000 who served in the
Civilian Conservation Corps between 1933 and 1942, eighty-four percent
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 451–470 (2006).
36 Except as otherwise provided in this title . . .  it shall be the duty of every male
citizen of the United States, and every other male person residing in the United
States, who . . . is between the ages of eighteen and twenty-six, to present himself
for and submit to registration at such time or times and place or places, and in
such manner, as shall be determined by proclamation of the President and by
rules and regulations prescribed hereunder.
Id. § 453(a).
37 The author acknowledges the voluntary nature of the CCC, distinguishing it from
both the draft and the national service program at the heart of this paper.  The author
discusses the CCC as a comparison point for a broad federal program, employing a large
number of Americans in a time of peace in a variety of programs.
38 See Donald J. Eberly & Michael W. Sherraden, National Service Precedents in The United
States, in NATIONAL SERVICE, supra note 5, at 41, 41–42 (“The CCC was generally perceived R
to be the most successful of Roosevelt’s New Deal programs, receiving the enthusiastic
endorsement of Roosevelt’s 1936 opponent, Alfred Landon.”).
39 Id. at 41.
40 BARBARA W. SOMMER, HARD WORK AND A GOOD DEAL 17 (2008).
41 Id. at 16.
42 Id. at 17.  For example, in Minnesota, CCC projects included “restoring and stabiliz-
ing national forests, developing and expanding state forests, building a state park system,
controlling flooding, and introducing soil conservation measures on agriculture lands in
the southern part of the state,” among others. Id. at 18.
43 Id. at 17.
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were “young, unmarried men between the ages of about 17 and 28.”44  The
government provided camp-style housing, food, and clothing for the men,
who were often working in remote parts of the country far from home.45  In
addition, to combat high levels of illiteracy among the men in the camps and
to provide for meaningful activity in the evenings after they had concluded
their work, the CCC installed academic programs in the camps.46  Life les-
sons were also a crucial part of the CCC; the director of the CCC referred to
the program as “a practical school where young men in their teens and early
twenties are taught how to work, how to live, and how to get ahead.”47
With the coming of World War II, Congress dissolved the Civilian Con-
servation Corps; the war eliminated the justifications which had spurred the
program’s creation, as fifteen million Americans, most from the same pool
the CCC drew from, were about to be called to serve in the military.48  While
programs at both the state and national level have attempted to recreate the
success of the Civilian Conservation Corps, none could match the New Deal
era program for its scope and impact.49
III. CONTOURS OF THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT’S PROHIBITION OF
INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE
With these broad programs as a historical backdrop, this section
presents a brief background and analysis of the Thirteenth Amendment,
through several seminal holdings of the Supreme Court and recent circuit
precedent.  This Note, in discussing the constitutionality of mandatory
national service, makes reference to additional constitutional provisions, but
a more expansive discussion of the Thirteenth Amendment is presented as
the Amendment is the primary—though not exclusive—focus of the analysis.
A. The Text and Early History
The Thirteenth Amendment was passed in the wake of the Civil War:
“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”50  Clearly, on its
face, the amendment abolished the practice of African slavery in the United
States.  Less clear, however, is the meaning of the phrase “involuntary servi-
tude” and just what Congress meant to abolish in enacting that portion of the
44 Arlene Barry, Is the Civilian Conservation Corps of the 1930s a 1990s Approach to Drop-
outs and Illiteracy?, 42 J. ADOLESCENT & ADULT LITERACY 648, 650 (1999).
To place the sheer size—3 million men!—of the CCC in perspective, consider this: in
the seventeen years from 1994 to 2011, only 704,000 people served in AmeriCorps. See
What is AmeriCorps?, supra note 9. R
45 Barry, supra note 44, at 650. R
46 Id. at 650–55.
47 SOMMER, supra note 40, at 19 (internal quotation marks omitted). R
48 Roger Landrum et al., supra note 5, at 31. R
49 See, e.g., Eberly & Sherraden, supra note 38, at 47–48. R
50 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
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amendment.51  As early as the ratification process, debate raged as to the
scope of the amendment, with liberal Republicans arguing for a broad grant
of power to the federal government to protect freedom and civil rights of all
people and conservative Republicans and Democrats uniting to assert that
the amendment addressed only a more narrow freedom from slavery.52
While much could and has been written on the debate as to the original
meaning of the amendment, this Note takes the Supreme Court’s precedent
as clear on the meaning of the provision and does not address the debate
amongst legal scholars as to the original and dynamic meaning of the Thir-
teenth Amendment.53
The Supreme Court, very early after the amendment was passed in the
Slaughter-House Cases,54 adopted the narrow interpretation of the amendment
and recognized that inclusion of the phrase indicated an intention by Con-
gress to abolish something more than African slavery, but still closely akin to
it:
The word servitude is of larger meaning than slavery, as the latter is popu-
larly understood in this country, and the obvious purpose was to forbid all
shades and conditions of African slavery.  It was very well understood that in
the form of apprenticeship for long terms, as it had been practiced in the
West India Islands, on the abolition of slavery by the English government, or
by reducing the slaves to the condition of serfs attached to the plantation,
the purpose of the article might have been evaded, if only the word slavery
had been used.55
Thus, in a way, “involuntary servitude” was a loophole-closing phrase.
The facts of the Slaughter-House Cases did not give the Court much of an
opportunity to expound on the definition of involuntary servitude, especially
when attempting to answer the question of a mandatory national service pro-
gram.56  However, the early twentieth-century Court shed further light on the
scope of the term in Butler v. Perry57 by describing what the term did not
51 The finger can be pointed squarely at Congress for this lack of clarity. See Comm.
on Fed. Legislation, supra note 17, at 624–25 (“The legislative debates on the Thirteenth R
Amendment focused exclusively on the abolition of African slavery as it had existed in the
United States, and did not discuss what was meant by the term ‘involuntary servitude.’”).
52 MICHAEL VORENBERG, FINAL FREEDOM 233–39 (2001).
53 Some scholars argue that the amendment “should protect exploited workers,
abused women, neglected children, and all other victims of relationships reminiscent of
slavery.  Such innovative interpretations have reawakened slumbering interest in the
amendment and revived the debate about the meaning of constitutional freedom.” Id. at
248; see also id. at 248 n.108 (compiling an “incomplete list” of recent law review articles
exploring such a broad interpretation).
54 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
55 Id. at 69.
56 At issue in the collected cases was a Louisiana statute which created and granted a
monopoly over animal slaughterhouses in New Orleans, as well as limiting where in the city
such slaughterhouses could be located. See id. at 59–60.  Clearly, however, the Court had
rejected the broad interpretation of liberal Republicans. See supra note 52 and accompany- R
ing text.
57 240 U.S. 328 (1916).
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encompass.  In Butler, petitioners challenged a Florida statute which required
capable men to perform bridge and road work without pay, subject to a crim-
inal fine for failure to comply.58  In relying on the Slaughter-House Cases, the
Court addressed the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment:
[T]he term involuntary servitude was intended to cover those forms of com-
pulsory labor akin to African slavery which in practical operation would tend
to produce like undesirable results.  It introduced no novel doctrine with
respect of services always treated as exceptional, and certainly was not
intended to interdict enforcement of those duties which individuals owe to
the State, such as services in the army, militia, on the jury, etc.  The great
purpose in view was liberty under the protection of effective government,
not the destruction of the latter by depriving it of essential powers.59
Roadwork, the Court determined, was akin to many of the duties long owed
to the state by its citizens,60 and thus did not violate the prohibition against
involuntary servitude.61
This framing—that the Thirteenth Amendment’s ban on involuntary
servitude “was to abolish all practices whereby subjection having some of the
incidents of slavery was legally enforced”62—has continued to shape courts’
interpretation of the Amendment.  When an individual has a choice to not
perform the required labor, even when consequences for such a choice are
“exceedingly bad,”63 courts have found the Amendment not to bar the labor.
The Ninth Circuit, for example, has upheld a state program requiring pro
bono services of its lawyers.64  Classic “civic duties”—such as jury duty65—
have also been upheld.  So, despite the struggles of courts to define the
phrase “involuntary servitude” precisely, the case law provides some guidance
on what the Thirteenth Amendment was intended to cover and what it does
not.
58 See id. at 329–30.  The Florida statute at issue required six ten-hour days of work and
provided options, including finding an eligible substitute or paying a fee to the county;
failure to satisfy any of these three requirements could result in a fifty-dollar fine or a
thirty-day imprisonment. Id. (citation omitted).
59 Id. at 332–33.
60 See id. at 331 (“From Colonial days to the present time conscripted labor has been
much relied on for the construction and maintenance of roads. The system was introduced
from England, and, while it has produced no Appian Way, appropriateness to the circum-
stances existing in rural communities gave it general favor.”).
61 See id. at 332–33.
62 United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475, 485 (2d Cir. 1964).
63 See, e.g., Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454, 459 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citing Shackney, 333 F.2d at 486).
64 See United States v. 30.64 Acres of Land, 795 F.2d 796, 800–01 (9th Cir. 1986) (find-
ing the alternate choice for an attorney is to not practice law).
65 See, e.g., Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 589 n.11 (1973).
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B. The Military Draft
1. Direct Challenges to Military Conscription
The United States military first utilized conscription to fill its ranks dur-
ing the Civil War.66  From the outset, the draft was met with constitutional
challenges, and Chief Justice Roger Taney drafted an opinion striking down
the act authorizing conscription as unconstitutional in anticipation of a case
reaching the Supreme Court.67  Taney, however, did not frame his argument
under the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of involuntary servitude,
instead arguing that the draft encroached on the powers of the states68 and
impermissibly extended the war powers of the federal government beyond
those enumerated in the Constitution.69  To Taney, the Federal Conscription
Act of 1863 was “unconstitutional and void.”70  Taney never issued his opin-
ion due to the fact that a case challenging the draft was never brought to the
Supreme Court in his tenure as Chief Justice.71
In 1918, with the United States firmly engaged in the First World War,
the Supreme Court had its first opportunity to address the constitutionality
of the military draft in Selective Draft Law Cases.72  While the Court spent sev-
eral pages recounting the historical raising of armies in the United States,73 it
briefly dismissed of the petitioners challenge under the Thirteenth Amend-
ment in a single sentence-long paragraph:
Finally, as we are unable to conceive upon what theory the exaction by gov-
ernment from the citizen of the performance of his supreme and noble duty
of contributing to the defense of the rights and honor of the nation, as the
result of a war declared by the great representative body of the people, can
be said to be the imposition of involuntary servitude in violation of the
prohibitions of the Thirteenth Amendment, we are constrained to the con-
clusion that the contention to that effect is refuted by its mere statement.74
The Court, in a similarly cursory discussion, dismissed other constitutional
challenges to the draft75 and upheld conscription, relying a great deal on the
expanded powers of the government under the Fourteenth Amendment.76
66 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. R
67 Leon Friedman, Conscription and the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 67
MICH. L. REV. 1493, 1546 (1969).
68 Roger B. Taney, Thoughts on the Conscription Law of the United States, in THE MILITARY
DRAFT, supra note 19, 207, 215–18. R
69 Id. at 213–15.
70 Id. at 218.
71 Friedman, supra note 68, at 1548. R
72 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
73 See id. at 377–88.
74 Id. at 390.
75 Id. at 389–90 (dismissing, among other arguments, a challenge on impermissible
delegation grounds and a challenge under the religious clauses of the First Amendment).
76 Id. at 389 (“But to avoid all misapprehension we briefly direct attention to that
Amendment for the purpose of pointing out . . . how completely it broadened the national
scope of the Government under the Constitution by causing citizenship of the United
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The draft continued during World War I and World War II, despite lack of a
declared war when the draft was initiated, and again through the Korean and
Vietnam Wars, similarly without a declared war.77  However, the Supreme
Court refused to hear any cases which would shed light on the necessity—or
lack thereof—of declared war to legitimize conscription.78  The Seventh Cir-
cuit, in United States v. Fallon,79 held that military conscription did not violate
the Thirteenth Amendment, dismissing the defendant’s argument as “not
founded on either logic or good sense.”80  Despite criticism,81 the holding of
the Selective Draft Law Cases remains good law, and registration for conscrip-
tion is still an obligation of all military age males.82
2. Conscientious Objector Challenges
During World War II, a Thirteenth Amendment challenge to an aspect
of conscription reached the Fifth Circuit in Heflin v. Sanford.83  The draft
board classified Petitioner, a military age male, as a conscientious objector
and ordered him to report to a camp for work in lieu of military service.84
He refused to report, was imprisoned, and challenged his imprisonment, by
habeas petition, on the grounds that such work amounted to involuntary ser-
vitude under the Thirteenth Amendment.85  Relying on Butler and the Selec-
tive Service Cases, the Fifth Circuit held that the Thirteenth Amendment had
“no application to a call for service made by one’s government according to
law to meet a public need, just as a call for money in such a case is taxation
and not confiscation of property.”86  While the court spoke broadly in terms
of Congress’s power to exact service “to meet public need,” the decision
States to be paramount and dominant instead of being subordinate and derivative . . . .”)
(footnote omitted).
77 See supra notes 26–31 and accompanying text. R
78 See Jason Britt, Note, Unwilling Warriors: An Examination of the Power to Conscript in
Peacetime, 4 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 400, 407–08 (2009).
79 407 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1969).
80 Id. at 624.  The defendant had argued that the lack of an exception in the text of
the Amendment “allowing the Government to force people into involuntary servitude
when it deems it necessary for military purposes” necessitated a finding that “the Thir-
teenth Amendment prohibits that form of involuntary servitude.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
81 For an argument as to why the draft is outside the Founder’s conception of the
military power, see generally Friedman, supra note 67.  Friedman, however, does not R
address the Thirteenth Amendment challenge. Id.
82 See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 83 (1981) (holding that requiring registration
of males only did not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment and reversing a lower court injunction on registration pursuant to the Military Selec-
tive Service Act).
83 142 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1944).
84 Id. at 799.
85 Id.
86 Id.
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focused primarily on the war power,87 and thus leaves open questions as to
whether or not such a broad public service requirement outside of the con-
text of war would survive such scrutiny.88
During the Korean and Vietnam War eras, challenges to compulsory
civilian labor in lieu of military service as violating the Thirteenth Amend-
ment again reached several circuit courts.  The Ninth Circuit, in Howze v.
United States,89 dismissed the argument that the Constitution “prohibits a
civilian labor draft in peacetime” by placing the program in the broader con-
text of the draft, which the Supreme Court has long held constitutional:
Compulsory civilian labor does not stand alone, but is the alternative to com-
pulsory military service.  It is not a punishment, but is instead a means for
preserving discipline and morale in the armed forces.  The power of Con-
gress to raise armies, and to take effective measures to preserve their effi-
ciency, is not limited by either the Thirteenth Amendment, or the absence
of a military emergency.90
The Seventh Circuit followed suit.91  Since these cases in the late 1950s
through the 1960s, the Thirteenth Amendment has not been evoked to chal-
lenge the military draft or civilian service in lieu of conscription.92
C. Mandatory Community Service in High School
More recently, several circuits have addressed Thirteenth Amendment
challenges of a decidedly different sort: state and local creation of commu-
nity service requirements for public high school students.
1. The Context—Doing Good to Graduate
The 1980s saw a sharp drop from the previous decade in community
service nationally, especially among those Americans twenty-four and
younger.93  This downward trend in community involvement has often been
linked to general concerns of civic disinterest.94  One survey in the early
87 Id. at 800 (“The Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery and involuntary servi-
tude, except as a punishment for crime, but was never intended to limit the war powers of
government or its right to exact by law public service from all to meet the public need.”).
88 See Comm. on Fed. Legislation, supra note 17, at 627. R
89 272 F.2d 146 (9th Cir. 1959).
90 Id. at 148.
91 See United States v. Holmes, 387 F.2d 781, 784 (7th Cir. 1967) (agreeing with the
Ninth Circuit decision in Howze).
92 See Britt, supra note 78, at 408. R
93 CORP. FOR NAT’L & CMTY. SERV., VOLUNTEERING IN AMERICA 2011 RESEARCH HIGH-
LIGHTS 2 (Aug. 2011), available at http://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/livable-com-
munities/learn/civic/volunteering-in-america-research-highlights-2011-aarp.pdf
(graphing service participation across various age demographics and finding a drop from
over 20% to under 15% for those age 16–19 and a drop from roughly 18% to 12% for
those age 20–24).
94 See, e.g., Justin Wagner, “Doing Good” in Schools: A Legal & Policy Perspective on Commu-
nity Service in Education, 17 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 56, 57 (2007) (“From 1975 to 2001,
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1990s concluded that “[t]he American electorate is angry, self-absorbed and
politically unanchored.”95  In response, politicians and scholars called for
“schools [to] redouble their efforts to counteract citizen apathy, improve citi-
zen knowledge, and increase citizen participation” through, among other
solutions, service based learning.96  Service integrated into a civics curricu-
lum in the classroom and in after-school programs became crucial.97  Gener-
ally, successful service learning programs in schools integrate the service
“with classroom learning and reflection.”98  These programs often include at
least “one of the three generally accepted elements of high-quality service
learning: student planning of the service activity, participating in regular ser-
vice for a semester or longer, and writing and reflecting on the service
experience.”99
States and school districts responded to the calls of youthful apathy by
enacting service requirements for graduation.100  Most sweepingly, Maryland
began requiring seventy-five hours of community service in order to gradu-
ate.101  Service learning—and service learning graduation requirements—for
public school students continue to grow in popularity among the states.102
Service among teens and young adults has grown dramatically since the
America’s youth failed to embrace the Tocquevillian model of civic engagement.  With
declining rates of voting and civic participation among young Americans, one could have
argued that the ‘ceaseless agitation’ of civic affairs that de Toqueville marveled at had, in
large part, ceased to exist.”).
95 Todd Clark et al., Service Learning as Civic Participation, 36 THEORY INTO PRACTICE
164, 164 (1997).
96 Id.
97 Wagner, supra note 94, at 60. R
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 See Scott Bullock & Dennis D. Hirsch, Commentary At Issue—Community Service: Do
Mandatory Service Requirements for Students Violate Their Rights?, 82 A.B.A. J. 50, 51 (listing, in
a table, various community service requirements in public school systems) (citation
omitted).
101 MD. CODE REGS. 13A.03.02.06 (1992) (permitting completion of an approved
“locally designed program in student service” in lieu of the seventy-five hour requirement).
The Maryland service requirement was adopted in its current form by the Maryland Board
of Education in 1992, withstanding several challenges from state legislators. History of Ser-
vice Learning, MD. STATE DEP’T OF ED., available at http://www.marylandpublicschools.org/
MSDE/programs/servicelearning/History-of-Service_Learning.htm.
102 For a table collecting the service learning statutes and regulations in all fifty states
and the District of Columbia, see Ed. Comm’n of the States, High School Graduation Require-
ment or Credit Toward Graduation—Service-Learning/Community Service, ECS.ORG, http://ecs.
force.com/mbdata/mbtab3NE?sid=a0i70000000wbyv&Rep=SL01 (last visited Mar.11,
2013).  Maryland and the District of Columbia remain the only states that require some
amount of community service for graduation of all public school students statewide. See id.
Nineteen states provide the framework for students to receive credit towards graduation
for community service. See id.  Seven states—Colorado, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Rhode
Island, Tennessee, and Wisconsin—permit local school boards to require service for gradu-
ation. See id.
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1980s;103 similarly—and as desired—civic engagement among these
demographics has increased as well.104
Despite the success of service learning programs, roughly half of the
states have no statewide community service program in their education pol-
icy.105  Mandatory community service in public schools has drawn harsh criti-
cism from the very beginning.106  In addition, state and district-wide service
graduation requirements faced constitutional challenges on several grounds.
Students and parents brought suit against several school districts in the early-
and mid-1990s, advancing differing constitutional claims.  The treatment of
these cases by the Circuit Courts of Appeal provide valuable insight into how
courts would assess the constitutionality of a broader, compulsory service pro-
gram of the scope this Note contemplates.
2. Involuntary Servitude and Service Learning
In Immediato v. Rye Neck School District,107 Steirer v. Bethlehem Area School
District,108 and Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Board of Education,109 the
Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits, respectively, heard constitutional chal-
lenges to community service requirements110 under the Thirteenth Amend-
ment.  The plaintiff-appellants in Immediato alleged that, “[b]ecause the
school district’s program requires students to serve others, it falls within the
definition of involuntary servitude and is prohibited by the Thirteenth
Amendment.”111  The appellants argued that there was servitude in the very
terms of the program: “Clearly, the program requires students to serve other
individuals or organizations.  The ‘direct provision’ of service to others is
103 CORP. FOR NAT’L & CMTY. SERV., supra note 93, at 2 (finding that, in 2010, more than R
25% of teenagers age 16–19 reported volunteering, as did roughly 18% of young adults age
20–24).
104 See Wagner, supra note 94, at 59 (“Surveys since the events of September 11, 2001, R
show an impressive rise in civic engagement: high school students are increasingly inter-
ested in government and current events, college freshmen are increasingly discussing polit-
ics, and young adults are voting in higher numbers.”).
105 See Ed. Comm’n of the States, supra note 102. R
106 See, generally, e.g., Bullock & Hirsch, supra note 100, at 50 (“Forcing people to do R
good is a sure way to destroy the spirit of volunteering.  Mandatory service is unwise and
unnecessary.”).
107 73 F.3d 454 (2d Cir. 1996).
108 987 F.2d 989 (3d Cir. 1993).
109 89 F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 1996).
110 The Rye Neck District required students to complete forty hours of service and a
program of classroom discussion during their four years of high school. Immediato, 73 F.3d
at 457.  The Bethlehem Area School District required enrollment in a “Community Service
Program” course and completion of sixty hours of community service during the four high
school years. Steirer, 987 F.2d at 991.  The Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Board of Education
required fifty hours of community service, with various additional reflection requirements,
including submission of a paper upon completion of the service. Herndon, 89 F.3d at
176–77.
111 Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 23, Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454 (2d
Cir. 1996) (No. 95-7237).
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what distinguishes compulsory student service from any other school
required activity.”112  Further, this violated the Thirteenth Amendment,
argued the appellants, because the withholding of a high school diploma
constituted a “legal sanction” and rendered the service involuntary.113  While
the school district argued that alternatives existed for those students who
chose not to participate, the appellants reasoned “these options were not
necessarily viable ones in today’s society”114 in which a high school diploma
is so essential.  The plaintiffs in the other cases made similar arguments on
appeal.115
The Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits rejected these arguments.  As
articulated by the Second Circuit, “the dispositive question” before each
court was “whether the mandatory community service program rises to the
level of ‘involuntary servitude’ contemplated by the amendment.”116  While
the plaintiffs requested the courts to apply the plain text of the amendment
in construing “involuntary servitude,”117 the courts framed the discussion in
terms of context and intent, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in
United States v. Kozminski: “The Supreme Court has observed . . . that the
phrase ‘involuntary servitude’ was intended to cover those forms of compul-
sory labor akin to African slavery which in practical operation would tend to
produce like undesirable results.”118  The Third Circuit conceded that,
within this framework, “it is easier to comprehend the ‘general spirit’ of the
phrase ‘involuntary servitude’ than it is to define the exact range of condi-
tions it prohibits.”119  In this light, the Third Circuit directly addressed the
appellant’s splitting of the phrase “involuntary servitude”120:
[I]t is more appropriate to consider whether, taking as a whole the set of
conditions existing in the imposition of a mandatory community service pro-
112 Id. at 27.
113 Id. at 29 (internal quotation marks omitted).
114 Wagner, supra note 94, at 67. R
115 See Brief of Appellants at 35–49, Steirer v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 987 F.2d 989 (3d
Cir. 1993) (No. 92-1359) (arguing that, on its face, the service requirement is servitude
without compensation as contemplated by the Amendment and, further, that withholding
of a diploma is “prima facie coercion,” satisfying the involuntary prong of the Amendment);
Brief of Appellants at 28–38, Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Bd. Of Educ., 89 F.3d 174
(4th Cir. 1996) (No. 95-2525) (arguing roughly the same).
116 Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454, 459 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Herndon
v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Bd. of Educ., 89 F.3d 174, 180 (4th Cir. 1996); Steirer v. Beth-
lehem Area Sch. Dist., 987 F.2d 989, 997–98 (3d Cir. 1993).
117 See supra notes 111–115 and accompanying text. R
118 Immediato, 73 F.3d at 459 (quoting United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 942
(1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Herndon, 89 F.3d at 181; Steirer, 987
F.2d at 998.
119 Steirer, 987 F.2d at 998 (citing Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 942); see also Immediato, 73 F.3d
at 459 (quoting the same).
120 “Plaintiffs argue (i) that the program is servitude because the students provide
unpaid service to the community for the benefits of others; and (ii) that participation in
the program is involuntary because the threat of not receiving a diploma is prima facie
coercion.” Steirer, 987 F.2d at 998.
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gram in a public high school, the students providing the services are in a
condition of involuntary servitude.121
The circuits found Supreme Court precedent to define the prohibition
of involuntary servitude in the Thirteenth Amendment as encompassing ser-
vitude enforced through either physical coercion or legal coercion.122  Estab-
lishing such coercion is not as simple as the plaintiffs in each case contended:
“the critical factor in every case finding involuntary servitude is that the vic-
tim’s only choice is between performing the labor on the one hand and phys-
ical and/or legal sanctions on the other.”123  In other words, “In the
Thirteenth Amendment context, ‘subtle or indirect’ pressure to work does
not render that work involuntary.”124  When the “individual may, at least in
some sense, choose not to perform, even where the consequences of that
choice are ‘exceedingly bad,’”125courts have found the Thirteenth Amend-
ment not to be violated.126  The students in each district had choices outside
of compliance.  For example, the Second Circuit construed the options fac-
ing students in the Rye Neck School District accordingly:
Although students who forego their required service will not graduate, they
may avoid the program and its penalties by attending private school, trans-
ferring to another public high school, or studying at home to achieve a high
school equivalency certificate.  While these choices may be economically or
psychologically painful, choices they are, nonetheless.127
Similarly, the government may impose legal sanctions to enforce certain
“well-established ‘civic duties’” without running afoul of the Thirteenth
Amendment.128  Within this contextual understanding, the Second, Third,
and Fourth Circuits held that the mandatory community service programs as
121 Id.
122 See Immediato, 73 F.3d at 460; Herndon, 89 F.3d at 181; Steirer, 987 F.2d at 998.
123 Steirer, 987 F.2d at 999 (citing Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 943).
124 Herndon, 89 F.3d at 180–81.
125 Immediato, 73 F.3d at 459 (quoting United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475, 486 (2d
Cir. 1964).
126 Both the Second and Third Circuits discussed two traditional forms of forced or
coerced labor which courts have upheld as constitutional because the petitioner has other
choices, albeit bad.  Lawyers are often required by states to perform pro bono work or aban-
don their practice of law. See Immediato, 73 F.3d at 459 (citing United States v. 30.64 Acres
of Land, 795 F.2d 796, 800–01 (9th Cir. 1986)); Steirer, 987 F.2d at 999 (same).  Similarly,
doctors who, in the context of a scholarship program, promise to perform pro bono medical
services in exchange for said funding may choose between performing the service or pay-
ing damages. See Immediato, 73 F.3d at 459 (citing United States v. Redovan, 656 F.Supp.
121, 128–29 (E.D. Pa. 1986)); Steirer, 987 F.2d at 999 (same).
127 Immediato, 73 F.3d at 460.
128 Steirer, 987 F.2d at 999 (discussing the Supreme Court jurisprudence upholding the
military draft, jury duty, and road construction). See also Immediato, 73 F.3d at 459 (“The
government may also require the performance of ‘civic duties’ such as military service, jury
duty, and upkeep of local public roads without trenching upon the Thirteenth Amend-
ment.” (citations omitted)).
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part of a school district’s graduation requirements did not amount to invol-
untary servitude as prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment.129
While these courts upheld the community service programs, “the Sec-
ond Circuit and Third Circuit noted some limitations to mandatory commu-
nity service programs in the context of the Thirteenth Amendment,”130
limitations that may prove particularly probative in the broader context of
this Note.  First, in Steirer, the Third Circuit refused to adhere to the logic of
the district court, which relied on Bobilin v. Board of Education131 in ruling for
the school district on the theory that the service served the public interest
rather than a private interest.  Instead, the Circuit left open the issue as to
whether “the Thirteenth Amendment is inapplicable merely because the
mandatory service requirement provides a public benefit by saving taxpayers
money.”132  Thus, “schools”—and presumably proponents of mandatory
national service programs such as those contemplated by this Note—“would
be wise to avoid relying solely on public benefits as a means of justifying pro-
grams under the Thirteenth Amendment and instead focus on the stark dif-
ferences between community service and the original intent of the
Amendment, slavery and involuntary servitude.”133
Second, the Second Circuit carved out situations in which community
service graduation requirements may amount to constitutionally impermissi-
ble involuntary servitude, without setting the specifics: “We have recognized
that ‘there may be some mandatory programs so ruthless in the amount of
work demanded, and in the conditions under which the work must be per-
formed, . . . that a court justifiably could conclude that the [work consti-
tuted] . . . involuntary servitude.’”134  Here, the court found that the school
district’s program did not reach an impermissibly “ruthless” volume: “The
work required is not severe: students must perform only forty hours of service
129 See Immediato, 73 F.3d at 460 (“Because we conclude that the mandatory community
service program is not, on the whole, ‘compulsory labor’ which, ‘in practical operation’
produces ‘undesirable results’ analogous to slavery, we hold that the District’s mandatory
community service program does not constitute impermissible involuntary servitude.”
(quoting United States v. Kozminski 487 U.S. 931, 942 (1988))); Herndon, 89 F.3d at 181
(“Graduation from a public high school is an important opportunity, but the threat of not
graduating does not rise to the level of ‘physical or legal coercion.’   More importantly, the
community service requirement is in no way comparable to the horrible injustice of human
slavery.  Thus it does not violate the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition of involuntary
servitude.” (citation omitted) (quoting Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 944)); Steirer, 987 F.2d at
1000 (“[W]e hold that the mandatory community service program instituted in the Bethle-
hem Area School District as a high school graduation requirement does not constitute
involuntary servitude prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment.”).
130 Wagner, supra note 94, at 68. R
131 403 F. Supp. 1095 (D. Haw. 1975) (upholding required cafeteria duty in public
schools as serving the public interest).
132 Steirer, 987 F.2d at 998.
133 Wagner, supra note 94, at 69. R
134 Immediato, 73 F.3d at 459 (quoting Jobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d 129, 132 (2d Cir.
1966) (upholding, but recognizing the quoted limitations on, state requirements of chores
for mental patients)).
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in four years.”135  In addition, the “conditions under which [the work] must
be performed” were deemed to be “hardly onerous,”136 as students were
allowed to choose where they served, how they served, and when they
served.137
Finally, the Second Circuit warned that a program may become so
exploitative as to amount to involuntary servitude under the Thirteenth
Amendment.138  By means of “a seemingly extreme example,”139 the Court
illustrated what it considered to be a program that would fail a constitutional
analysis under the amendment:
If, for instance, the students were required to spend their Saturdays at the
homes of their teachers, washing their cars, painting their houses, and weed-
ing their gardens, the extent, nature, and conditions of “service,” and the
more obviously exploitative purpose of the program, might indeed warrant a
finding of “involuntary servitude.”140
While such a scenario is unlikely—either in the context of graduation
requirements or of our broader context of a mandated national service com-
mitment—keeping in mind the fact that the nature of the work may be rele-
vant to the analysis will be valuable in shaping such a program.
3. Additional Constitutional Challenges
The plaintiffs in these cases raised additional constitutional challenges
which merit brief discussion.  For although the focus of this Note is the rela-
tionship between mandatory national service and the Thirteenth Amend-
ment’s prohibition of involuntary servitude, these arguments may shed light
on additional, creative challenges plaintiffs may raise to contest the constitu-
tionality of a national program.
Only the Third Circuit in Steirer faced a challenge to the community
service graduation requirement on First Amendment grounds: “Plaintiffs
contend on appeal that performing mandatory community service is expres-
sive conduct because it forces them to declare a belief in the value of altru-
ism.”141  Such a finding would require strict judicial scrutiny to determine
whether the school district’s reasons were compelling enough to outweigh
this infringement on the students’ rights.142  In affirming the decision below,
135 Id. at 460.
136 Id.
137 Id. (“Students may choose among a nearly infinite variety of organizations offering a
kaleidoscope of service activities.  They are free to arrange their own work schedules, and
to work in the summers when other school-related duties are minimal.”).
138 See id. (“It is important to note that the purpose of the program is not exploitative.
Rather, it is educational, particularly when coupled with the related classroom
discussions.”).
139 Wagner, supra note 94, at 68. R
140 Immediato, 73 F.3d at 460.
141 Steirer v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 987 F.2d 989, 993 (1993).
142 See id.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-5\NDL517.txt unknown Seq: 19  3-JUL-13 16:21
2013] mandatory  national  service 2615
the Court found “the Program does not compel expression protected by the
First Amendment,” and thus, the Court did not apply strict scrutiny.143
According to the Third Circuit, “[t]he freedom of speech protected by
the First Amendment, though not absolute, ‘includes both the right to speak
freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.’”144  Relying on state-
ments by school board members speaking in favor of altruism, the plaintiffs
argued that the community service qualifies as speech “expressive of the
school district’s ideological viewpoint favoring altruism.”145  To amount to
expressive speech—and thus warrant First Amendment protection—an
action must embody an “‘affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind.’”146
Inherent in this is a finding that the “conduct . . . is ‘sufficiently imbued with
elements of communication.’”147
Within this framework, the Third Circuit set out to assess “the nature of
the activity in conjunction with the factual context and environment in which
it [was] undertaken.”148  The court considered the “viewer’s perception”149
and found it unlikely that someone in the community, viewing students vol-
unteering, would consider the action an endorsement or belief in the value
of altruism.  Instead, the court wrote, “students performing community ser-
vice under the auspices of a highly publicized required school program will
be viewed merely as students completing their high school graduation
requirements.”150  The court also found relevant the setting, as “[t]he
boundaries of expressive conduct have been particularly cabined when the
conduct is associated with school curricula”151 as well as school restrictions
on hair and dress.152  Finally, the court found unrealistic contentions that
the students were required to affirm the school district’s philosophy, as noth-
143 Id. at 997.
144 Id. at 993 (footnote omitted) (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714
(1977)).
145 Id.
146 Id. at 994 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633 (1943));
see also id. at 994–95 (discussing Supreme Court case law that found “compelled conduct”
to implicate the Amendment’s freedom of speech protection only when “obviously expres-
sive,” including saluting the flag during the pledge in school, state mottos on license plates,
and mandatory union contributions by teachers for political purposes).
147 Id. at 995 (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974) (holding that
flags have, according to Supreme Court precedent, “communicative connotations”)).
148 Id. at 995.
149 Id. (relying on the Supreme Court’s holdings in a long line of cases considering
“viewer’s perception” a factor in protection of expressive conduct).
150 Id. at 997.
151 Id. at 996 (“For example, we have held that although teachers have a First Amend-
ment right to advocate the use of particular teaching methods outside of the classroom,
this right does not ‘extend to choosing their own curriculum or classroom management
techniques in contravention of school policy or dictates.’” (quoting Bradley v. Pittsburgh
Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172, 1176 (3d Cir. 1990))).
152 See id. (“[C]ourts have consistently found that hair and dress codes do not infringe
students’ First Amendment rights in the absence of any showing that a student’s appear-
ance was intended as the symbolic expression of an idea.”).
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ing indicated negative consequences for students who spoke out against the
program.153  Thus, despite the value judgments involved in creating the pro-
gram,154 the Third Circuit upheld the district court’s decision in finding no
implication of the First Amendment.
However, a word of caution from the court on the First Amendment
should be considered by any politician seeking to create a mandatory
national service program: a service program may cross the line and implicate
the Amendment if “a student . . . was required to provide community service
to an organization whose message conflicted with the student’s contrary
view.”155  Thus, school districts would be wise to “either ensur[e] that stu-
dents have a reasonable and diverse set of community service programs to
choose between or by simply implementing a service activity that is suffi-
ciently non-objectionable to a reasonable member of the community.”156  To
avoid similar First Amendment challenges, a mandatory national service pro-
gram must be structured so as to provide broad service choices or non-objec-
tionable activities.
The student-plaintiffs in both Immediato and Herndon also raised an addi-
tional constitutional claim, invoking their substantive due process rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment.157  Specifically, the plaintiffs in both
cases argued that the forced service violated the students’ personal liberty
153 See id.  The court might look on the program differently if the students were “con-
fined to the expression of those sentiments that are officially approved.” Id. (quoting
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
154 The court, in fact, acknowledged the pervasiveness of value judgments made in run-
ning a school system: “The gamut of courses in a school’s curriculum necessarily reflects
the value judgments of those responsible for its development, yet requiring students to
study course materials, write papers on the subjects, and take the examinations is not pro-
hibited by the First Amendment.” Id. at 993.  These value judgments are generally part of
the “considerable discretion” afforded school boards. Id. (quoting Edwards v. Aguillard,
482 U.S. 578, 583 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  In the context of the cur-
riculum, “[t]he constitutional line is crossed when . . . the educators demand that students
express agreement with the educators’ values.” Id. at 994.
155 Id. at 996.
156 Wagner, supra note 94, at 66–67. R
157 The parents of the students in both cases raised substantive due process claims as
well. See Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454, 461–62 (2d Cir. 1996); Herndon v.
Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Bd. of Educ., 89 F.3d 174, 177–79 (4th Cir. 1996).  While both
courts acknowledged the rights of parents in the raising of their children, see Immediato, 73
F.3d at 461 (“Parents . . . have a liberty interest, properly cognizable under the Fourteenth
Amendment, in the upbringing of their children.”); Herndon, 89 F.3d at 177 (“The
Supreme Court long has recognized the existence of parents’ right to direct their chil-
dren’s education.”), both courts dismissed this claim under rational-basis scrutiny, finding
the regulation to be reasonable and advancing a legitimate state interest. See Immediato, 73
F.3d at 462; Herndon, 89 F.3d at 179.
For the purposes of this Note, we need not investigate the parents’ claims any further,
as the mandatory national service programs would apply only to adults age eighteen and
over.
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not to serve.158  Both circuits took seriously the Supreme Court’s recent sub-
stantive due process jurisprudence, in which the Court expressed a
“‘reluctan[ce] to expand the concept of substantive due process,’”159 going
“beyond the Bill of Rights only to rights that ‘involv[e] the most intimate and
personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal
dignity and autonomy . . . .’”160  Finding no case law to support the claims of
the plaintiffs and justify expansion of substantive due process to include a
student’s right to choose to engage in community service,161 both courts
denied the Fourteenth Amendment claims.162
IV. ANALYZING POTENTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO A BROAD
PROGRAM OF NATIONAL SERVICE
The limited jurisprudence—especially in the Supreme Court—on the
Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of involuntary servitude provides no
concrete answers to the central question presented by this Note: would a pro-
gram requiring all Americans to serve some period of mandatory civilian ser-
vice withstand a constitutional challenge?  Despite the lack of a clear answer,
the Supreme Court—and to a greater extent the circuit courts of appeal—
have provided some insights into how such a program would be analyzed,
including what factors the Court would consider in weighing such a program.
This section presents three programs which would dramatically expand
national service.  The first presents little in terms of constitutional issues but
fails to necessarily reach all target Americans.  The second attempts to com-
mandeer an existing, constitutional structure.  The third squarely addresses
the challenging constitutional question.  This section will discuss the consti-
tutional issues—if any—each present.
A. The Easy Answer—Offering a Larger Carrot or Wielding a Bigger Stick
For those interested in dramatically expanding public service without
risking serious constitutional challenges, the easiest solution would be to dra-
matically expand the currently existing programs, most notably AmeriCorps,
and adding additional incentives or, in the alternative, new sanctions to
encourage involvement.  The problem with expansion by either means is that
158 See Immediato, 73 F.3d at 462–63; Herndon, 89 F.3d at 179.
159 Immediato, 73 F.3d at 463 (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115,
125 (1992)).
160 Herndon, 89 F.3d at 180 (alteration in original) (quoting Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
161 See Immediato, 73 F.3d at 463 (“[T]hey cite not a single case in which this ‘individual
choice’ has been declared a fundamental right, or has warranted strict scrutiny of a govern-
mental regulation.”); Herndon, 89 F.3d at 179 (“[T]here is no precedent for their argu-
ment . . . .”).
162 See Immediato, 73 F.3d at 463 (finding that a student’s “free time, and whether or not
he will perform any volunteer services” is not constitutionally protected); Herndon, 89 F.3d
at 180 (“The decision to serve one’s community is important, but it is not so ‘intimate and
personal’ that it merits Fourteenth Amendment protection.”).
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all Americans would still not be required to participate in service, as neither
proposal is in any sense mandatory.163  Currently, the existing service pro-
grams have very little to offer potential applicants in terms of incentives.164
AmeriCorps, for instance, offers a “modest living allowance,”165 health cover-
age,166 and educational benefits, including loan deferment167 and grant
money.168  The Peace Corps offers similar educational loan deferments,169
while providing slightly more in terms of immediate financial benefits.170
There are also practical benefits in terms of training and job opportunities
opened up by both organizations.171  And, of course, both organizations
offer benefits that are more difficult to measure and which typical careers do
not offer, such as personal fulfillment.172
163 Arguments could be raised that sufficiently harsh sanctions could amount to a pro-
gram that is mandatory in practical effect. See infra notes 179–184 and accompanying text. R
164 Admittedly, these tangible benefits are dramatically more than those of true volun-
teering, but when one compares them to the salaries available in the private sector, it
seems accurate to describe the benefits as “little.”
165 See Benefits of AmeriCorps Service, AMERICORPS, http://www.americorps.gov/for_indi-
viduals/benefits/index.asp (last visited Mar. 11, 2013).
166 See AmeriCorps State and National, AMERICORPS, http://www.americorps.gov/for_indi-
viduals/choose/state_national.asp (last visited Mar. 11, 2013).
167 See Postponing Student Loan Payments & Getting Interest Paid, AMERICORPS, http://
www.americorps.gov/for_individuals/benefits/benefits_ed_award_repayment.asp (last vis-
ited Mar. 11, 2013) (“Individuals who are serving in a term of service in an approved Amer-
iCorps position may be eligible to temporarily postpone the repayment of their qualified
student loans through an action called loan forbearance. . . . [I]f you successfully complete
your term of service the National Service Trust will pay all or a portion of the interest that
accrued on your qualified student loans during your service period.”).
168 See Segal AmeriCorps Education Award, AMERICORPS, http://www.americorps.gov/for_
individuals/benefits/benefits_ed_award.asp (last visited Mar. 11, 2013) (noting that, in
2011, participants received an education award of $5500 dollars to be utilized for repaying
outstanding student loans or pursue further higher education).  In addition, some colleges
and universities match these awards or provide other benefits. See Institutions That Provide
Scholarships and Resources to AmeriCorps Alumni, AMERICORPS, http://www.americorps.gov/
for_individuals/benefits/ed_award_match.asp (last visited Mar. 11, 2013).
169 See Financial Benefits and Loan Deferment, PEACE CORPS (Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.
peacecorps.gov/learn/whyvol/finben/.
170 See id. (“The Peace Corps provides Volunteers with a living allowance . . . covering
housing, food, and incidentals.  It provides complete dental and medical care during ser-
vice . . . . It also covers the cost of transportation to and from the country of service. Unlike
other international volunteer programs, there is not a fee to participate in the Peace
Corps.”).  The Peace Corps also provides post-service transitional funding, the use of which
is not restricted. See id.
171 According to AmeriCorps, participants “gain valuable experience that translates
directly into job experience in [their] chosen field” including “teamwork, communication,
responsibility, and other essential skills.” Benefits of AmeriCorps Service, supra note 165.  The R
Peace Corps provides training in “a foreign language, technical,  skills, and cross-cultural
understanding,” skills which are crucial in a globalized world. Professional and Career Bene-
fits, PEACE CORPS (Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.peacecorps.gov/learn/whyvol/profben/.
172 The AmeriCorps benefits page, before even addressing educational funding or
other tangible benefits, stresses the intangible benefits: “Perhaps the biggest benefit you
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Increased incentives could draw more young people to the existing pro-
grams.  Expanded living expense programs, for example, could draw people
afraid they will be unable to make ends meet on the minimal allowance of
either program.  AmeriCorps could, borrowing from the Peace Corps pro-
gram, provide additional incentives by directly covering travel expenditures
or living expenses.  Of course, increased benefits, without expanded opportu-
nities, could simply create an even larger backlog of applications.173  The flip
side, of course, is that expanded opportunities and expanded benefits will
dramatically increase costs of these programs.
Expanding the incentives for existing programs would face no non-frivo-
lous constitutional challenge that this author can foresee, as these are noth-
ing more than increased appropriations for longstanding programs.
Alternatively, Congress could encourage national service by installing a
system of sanctions or disincentives.  Congress could, for example, require all
colleges and universities receiving federal funding of any kind to install a
service requirement in its curriculum or risk losing federal funding.  Another
sanction-based means of expanding service would be to target students more
directly by requiring all students who accept any federal financial aid to com-
plete some minimum service requirement.  These are simply two of the more
powerful, and potentially landscape-shifting, sanctions Congress could
employ; any number of other creative sanctions could be imposed.
Interesting challenges could be raised against the use of sanctions to
expand service programs, although these would likely ultimately fail.  First of
all, tying federal funding of colleges and universities to the creation or
expansion of service programs falls within Congress’s broad spending pow-
ers.174  The constitutionality of conditional spending, and the framework for
analyzing such spending, was outlined by the Supreme Court in South Dakota
v. Dole.175  In Dole, the Court discussed the ability of Congress “ ‘to further
broad policy objectives by conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon com-
pliance by the recipient with federal statutory and administrative direc-
tives.’”176 Dole requires a four-part analysis of conditional spending: the
spending must be in pursuit of the “general welfare”; the condition must be
unambiguous, so as to allow the state to make a knowing choice; the condi-
tion must be related to the federal interest in the program; and, finally, the
will experience when you join AmeriCorps is the satisfaction of incorporating service into
your life and making a difference in your community and your country.” Benefits of
AmeriCorps Service, supra note 165.  The Peace Corps site similarly touts intangibles: “Peace R
Corps is a life-defining leadership experience you will draw upon throughout your life.
The most significant accomplishment will be the contribution you make to improve the
lives of others.” What Are the Benefits?, PEACE CORPS (Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.
peacecorps.gov/learn/whyvol/.
173 See supra note 11. R
174 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence
and general Welfare of the United States . . . .”).
175 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
176 Id. at 206 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980)).
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condition cannot be unconstitutional under another provision of the Consti-
tution.177  There is little reason to doubt a service program, operating on
principles of conditional spending, would merit a hard look.  The most legiti-
mate challenge would be under the third prong of the Dole analysis—the
condition must be related to the federal interest—but service can easily be
tied to the educational goals of colleges and universities, thus promoting the
federal interest in the project.178
In addition, the use of sanctions directly targeted at students could raise
issues under the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of involuntary servi-
tude.  A college degree has become a near necessity for employment in
American culture179 while the price of college continues to skyrocket,180
pushing young people deeper into debt.181  The federal government pro-
vides a large percentage of higher education loans,182 and losing these loans
might discourage college attendance.  In a sense, then, national service
would become de facto mandatory, as the alternative choices are finding less
favorable, higher interest private loans to fund a college education or to not
attend college at all.  The courts, however, have refused to give much
credence to arguments that such “bad choices” amount to involuntary servi-
tude as contemplated by the Thirteenth Amendment.  For example, a pro-
gram requiring doctors to perform pro bono medical services as part of a
scholarship award was upheld at the district court level.183  Similarly, the
choice between graduating high school and completing a service learning
requirement has been upheld as not violating the Thirteenth Amend-
177 See id. at 207–08.
178 Cf. supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text (discussing the integration of service R
and learning at the high school level).
179 See generally Cynthia English, Most Americans See College as Essential to Getting a Good
Job: College Educated Least Likely to be Unemployed or Underemployed, GALLUP (Aug. 18, 2011),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/149045/americans-college-essential-getting-good-job.aspx
(finding that nearly seventy percent of Americans consider a college degree “essential” for
getting a job and analyzing the correlation between education attained and employment).
180 See, e.g., Daniel de Vise, No “Magic Solution” to College Affordability, WASH. POST (July
25, 2012, 1:28 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/college-inc/post/no-magic-
solution-to-college-affordability/2012/07/25/gJQA3d0G9W_blog.html (“The latest figures
from the College Board put the average cost for 2011–2012, including tuition, fees, room
and board, at $17,131 for four-year public colleges (a 6 percent increase over the previous
year) and $38,589 for private, nonprofit institutions (a 4.4 percent increase over the previ-
ous year).”).
181 See Average Debt Up Again for New College Grads, USA TODAY (Oct. 18, 2012, 6:55 AM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance/2012/10/18/student-debt-
increases-again/1639907/ (“Two-thirds of the national college class of 2011 finished
school with loan debt, and those who borrowed walked off the graduation stage owing on
average $26,600—up about 5% from the class before.”).
182 See id. (“Private (non-federal) student loans, which generally have weaker borrower
protections but have been diminishing as a source of student borrowing, accounted for
about one-fifth of the debt owed by the Class of 2011.”).
183 United States v. Redovan, 656 F. Supp. 121, 128–29 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
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ment.184  It is likely that, in light of the limited precedent in these parallel
situations, a program of expanded national service by way of increased sanc-
tions would similarly be found to not violate the Thirteenth Amendment.
B. The Middle Answer—Mandatory National Service Tied to the Military Draft
Much like the “easy answer,”185 in which incentives and sanctions may
vary, there is no single scheme or plan to institute a system by which all Amer-
icans participate in national service.  However, a proposal shared by some
politicians186 and scholars187 has taken shape: integrating civilian national
service into the existing framework of the military draft.  The Universal
National Service Act,188 as proposed by Representative Charles Rangel, lays
out the framework for such a program.  Under the Act, every citizen and
resident of the United States between the ages of eighteen and forty-two189
would be required to serve a two-year term of national service, subject to
some exceptions.190  The national service obligation could be satisfied in sev-
eral ways: voluntary military service, conscripted military service, conscripted
civilian service, or voluntary civilian service.191  Limits are placed on when
military service may be required192 and how many people may be conscripted
into military service.193  While military conscription would only be author-
ized in times of war or similar circumstances, the two-year obligation to serve
always exists.194
While the Supreme Court has never addressed such a program, its deci-
sion in the Selective Draft Law Cases195 as well as the circuit court conscientious
objector decisions196 seem to provide an answer to the question whether
such a program would withstand scrutiny under the Thirteenth Amendment.
Despite arguments to the contrary, the Supreme Court has refused to hear
further challenges to the power of the federal government to require military
service.  Similarly, obligations to serve in a civilian capacity, as an alternative
to military service, have been upheld not in their own right but as a means to
satisfy the already existing and constitutionally valid military obligation of citi-
184 See, e.g., Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454, 459 (2d Cir. 1996); see also
supra notes 125–127 and accompanying text. R
185 See supra Part IV.A.
186 See, e.g., Charles B. Rangel, Bring Back the Draft, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2002, at A19,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/31/opinion/bring-back-the-draft.html.
187 See, e.g., Charles Moskos & Paul Glastris, Now Do You Believe We Need a Draft?, WASH.
MONTHLY, Nov. 2001, at 9.
188 Universal National Service Act, H.R. 5741, 111th Cong. (2010).
189 Id. § 102(a).
190 Id. § 104.
191 Id. § 103(d).  So, for example, an eligible person can elect to serve Teach For
America, thus fulfilling his obligation under the act and avoiding conscription.
192 Id. § 103(b).
193 Id. § 103(c).
194 Id.
195 245 U.S. 366 (1918). See supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text. R
196 See supra Part III.B.2.
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zens.  As the Ninth Circuit wrote in upholding conscientious objector labor
requirements, “[c]ompulsory civilian labor does not stand alone, but is the
alternative to compulsory military service,” and thus falls within the historic
power of Congress to conscript.197  While reinstating active conscription (as
opposed to simply requiring registration) and expanding the scope so that all
of-age citizens must participate will certainly draw harsh criticism in the pub-
lic sphere and face strong political opposition, the courts—based on prece-
dent—will likely not stand in the way of such a program.
C. The Challenging Answer—True Mandatory Civilian Service
Finally, Congress could create a program requiring all Americans to per-
form a minimum term of civilian service independent of the infrastructure of
the pre-existing selective service system.  There are reasons to separate mili-
tary and civilian conscription.  From a philosophical standpoint, opposition
to war or the buildup of the military industrial complex might lead one to
desire severing a service from the military, so that the civilian program could
be expanded while the military is contracted.  In addition, military leaders
may want to continue to operate with an all-volunteer army.  Pragmatically,
military training costs a great deal, and military leaders want to reap the long-
est return from this investment.  Thus, with an all-volunteer army, the mili-
tary is likely able to secure longer commitments.198
A program of compulsory service devoid of any connection to the mili-
tary presents a wholly novel question of constitutional law:
The “public need” exception, discussed in the conscientious objector cases,
has never been applied to a full-scale national service requirement which was
not related to the military . . . . None of the other non-military requirements
have involved anything remotely comparable to the commitment that a full-
scale national service project would require.  Moreover, the language in the
decisions . . . suggests that a public service requirement must be
“traditional” . . . .199
Charles Black, writing two decades earlier, concluded that such a program
would be constitutionally dubious.200
The trio of circuit court decisions201 from the 1990s addressing the issue
of community service graduation requirements can be looked to for addi-
tional clarity, as these cases fill some of the doctrinal gaps left open in
attempting to analogize to the conscientious objector cases.  Community ser-
197 Howze v. United States, 272 F.2d 146, 148 (9th Cir. 1959).
198 Bruce Chapman, A Bad Idea Whose Time Is Past: The Case Against Universal Service,
BROOKINGS REV., Fall 2002, at 10, 11.
199 Comm. on Fed. Legislation, supra note 17, at 632. R
200 Charles L. Black, Constitutional Problems in Compulsory “National Service,” 13 YALE L.
REP. (1967), reprinted in STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 156, 162
(1969) (“I will close by restating only one idea that, in my mind, summarizes the whole
case, whether of constitutionalism or of policy.  Large-scale coercion of labor is foreign to
our traditions and to our Constitution.”).
201 See supra Part III.C.
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vice programs fall outside both the “public need” in times of war exception as
the courts have addressed it202 as well as outside the “traditional civic duties”
exception as characterized by cases such as Butler v. Perry.203  The circuits
upheld the community service programs, but provided three warnings
regarding the validity under the Thirteenth Amendment which lend clarity
to this discussion.204
First, the Third Circuit in Steirer upheld the service requirement, but
refused to follow the lower court’s reasoning that service requirements can
be justified solely on the grounds that the program provides for “the public,
and not private, interest and benefit.”205  Essential to the court’s analysis was
not the benefit received by the public, but the “stark differences” between
what the students were required to do and what the Thirteenth Amendment
was ratified to eliminate.  From the outset, the Supreme Court has held that
involuntary servitude incorporates “those forms of compulsory labor akin to
African slavery which in practical operation would tend to produce like unde-
sirable results.”206  While the “general spirit”207 of the phrase fails to defini-
tively answer the question, it provides the context in which advocates of
compulsory service should present the program, whether before the courts,
Congress, or the American people.  Such a program would bear little resem-
blance to the institution of African slavery.  Presumably, any such program
would include job training, provide minimal health, salary, and living bene-
fits, and be aimed towards broad public ends.  Additionally, it should be
noted that such service is much more akin to—though much broader in
scope than—the constitutionally valid “traditional” civic duty exceptions208
than it is to slavery.
Second, in Immediato, the Second Circuit indicated an inclination to find
the program unconstitutional under the Thirteenth Amendment if it became
“ruthless” in terms of volume of work and conditions in which the work is to
be done.209  The court provided little insight as to what constituted ruthless
202 See, e.g., Heflin v. Sanford, 142 F.2d 798, 800 (5th Cir. 1944).
203 240 U.S. 328 (1916); see also supra notes 57–61 and accompanying text. R
204 See supra notes 130–140 and accompanying text.  This section presumes the pro- R
gram will be truly mandatory, meaning that there will be some sort of criminal sanction.
Otherwise, the program would have to rely on other sanctions and/or incentives, falling
under the discussion in Part IV.A.  As the court in Immediato found, when the “individual
may, at least in some sense, choose not to perform, even where the consequences of that
choice are ‘exceedingly bad,’” the Thirteenth Amendment is not violated.  Immediato v.
Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454, 459 (2d Cir. 1996) (citation omitted).
205 Steirer v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 987 F.2d 989, 998–1000 (3d Cir. 1993).
206 Immediato, 73 F.3d at 459 (quoting United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 942
(1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
207 Id.
208 See, e.g., Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 589 n.11 (1973) (upholding
mandatory jury duty requirements); Butler, v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 332–33 (1916) (uphold-
ing state mandated road and bridge work); United States v. 30.64 Acres of Land, 795 F.2d
796, 800–01 (9th Cir. 1986) (upholding mandatory pro bono services for lawyers).
209 Immediato, 73 F.3d at 459.
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volume, only finding the conditions at issue to be “hardly onerous” and the
forty hour requirement over four years to not be severe; the court did indi-
cate approval as well of the options students had in terms of where and how
to serve.210  Arguments could be made that mandatory service reaches a
“ruthless” volume; any such program would mandate full-time service for a
period of time, probably one or two years, amounting to a significant portion
of a young person’s life.  Perhaps the “ruthlessness” could be tempered by
allowing flexibility in terms of when to serve.211  The conditions would
clearly not be “ruthless” if some sort of living stipend and other benefits, like
training, were provided.  Choice between types of service, based on interest
and qualification, would further temper the onerousness of the conditions.
Further, the Second Circuit did not indicate as to how these factors would be
weighed against each other; it is possible that, despite a high volume of
hours, conditions could be such as to not create a ruthless environment.
Finally, the Second Circuit warned against exploitative service pro-
grams.212  In light of the somewhat ridiculous example the court provided—
basically, high school students performing personal chores for teachers213—
this limitation is not much of one.  Proponents of mandatory service simply
must avoid exploitation or the appearance of exploitation.  In the national
service context, this would seem to encompass anything from the ridicu-
lous—chores for Congressmen—to the slightly more realistic—assigning of
volunteers to states/jurisdictions as some sort of political favor.  By relying on
existing national structures—AmeriCorps and the National Parks, to name
only two, as well as various private organizations—to place volunteers in legit-
imate service opportunities, this concern should be easy to avoid.
Using these limitations as guidance, a system of mandatory national ser-
vice is clearly a close constitutional call under the Thirteenth Amendment’s
prohibition of involuntary servitude.  Mandatory service is a type of labor dis-
tinct from the labor the amendment was ratified to prevent.  However, it does
not fit neatly into any of the specifically constitutional categories the
Supreme Court has addressed.  The closest issue is what the Second Circuit
refers to as “ruthlessness.”  If a balancing test is employed, weighing condi-
tions of work against volume of work, mandatory service should survive scru-
tiny.  The draft was a novel concept at the time it was first adopted, and it has
become so entrenched in our history that the Supreme Court has refused to
hear further challenges as to its legitimacy.  The power of the federal govern-
ment is broad, allowing for adaptive measures to meet the evolving demands
of an ever-changing world.  One need look no further for a testament to this
210 Id.
211 For example, a program could allow inductees to choose between pre- and post-
college programs, with service assignments of different character depending on education,
interest, etc.
212 See supra notes 138–140 and accompanying text. R
213 Id.
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than the Supreme Court’s recent health care decision.214  While one cannot
say definitively either way, a program of mandatory service, so structured as
to avoid the pitfalls discussed above, could survive scrutiny under the Thir-
teenth Amendment.
V. CONCLUSION: ANSWERING PRESIDENT KENNEDY’S CALL
This Note began with the words of then-Senator John F. Kennedy issuing
a call to serve the less fortunate in foreign lands, stating, “the effort must be
far greater than we have ever made in the past.”215  Since Kennedy initiated
the Peace Corps as one of his first acts as president, hundreds of thousands of
Americans have answered his call to serve, not only in the Peace Corps but in
AmeriCorps and countless other local, national, and international organiza-
tions.  These efforts are something to be admired, and creating more oppor-
tunities does not take away from what has already been accomplished.
Scholars, politicians, and the public more broadly will continue to debate the
normative merits of a system of mandatory national service.  Political opposi-
tion may remain as a barrier to greater service opportunities; the Constitu-
tion should not.
214 See generally Nat’l Fed’n of Ind. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (upholding
the health insurance mandate of “Obamacare” as an exercise of Congress’s power to tax).
215 Kennedy, supra note 1.
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